

## Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 241430

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS :PFOR, XG  
SUBJECT: PLANNING TALKS PAPER

1. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF PAPER PREPARED FOR UPCOMING  
SESSION OF US-JAPAN PLANNING TALKS TO BE HELD ANNAPOLIS  
DECEMBER 19-21. PLEASE CONVEY SOONEST TO TACHIBANA.  
(FYI. OTHER THREE PAPERS GIVEN TO JAPANESE EMBASSY HERE  
DECEMBER 4 TO BE POUCHED TOKYO. COPIES HAVE BEEN POUCHED  
TO YOU.)

2. TEXT.

US-JAPAN PLANNING TALKS  
DECEMBER 19-21, 1973  
US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN  
EUROPE IN 1973 HAVE BEEN UNEVEN. SOME DEVELOPMENTS HAVE  
CONFIRMED THEIR COOPERATION; OTHERS--PERHAPS THE MORE  
IMPORTANT--HAVE WEAKENED IT.

.) THE US AND THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN GOING  
THROUGH A COMPLEX PERIOD OF TRYING TO ADAPT THEIR  
RELATIONSHIP TO CHANGING CONDITIONS. THIS PROCESS HAS  
INVOLVED NOT ONLY CONCRETE ISSUES BUT, FOR THE FIRST TIME,  
AN EFFORT TO DEFINE THE PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD GUIDE THEIR  
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COLLABORATION. EVENTS OF RECENT MONTHS HAVE DEMONSTRATED  
THE IMPORTANCE, BUT ALSO THE DIFFICULTY, OF REACHING  
AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO BOTH CURRENT POLICY ISSUES AND  
THE "GOALS FOR THE FUTURE" CALLED FOR BY SECRETARY

KISSINGER IN APRIL.

2) AT THE SAME TIME, THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAS CONTINUED TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ITS MEMBERS IN EUROPE. FURTHER, THEY HAVE ENGAGED IN UNPRECEDENTED JOINT EFFORTS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF DETENTE IN EUROPE IN THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS THAT GOT UNDERWAY THIS FALL, IN GENEVA AND VIENNA. BUT THE BASELESS SUSPICIONS VOICED BY SOME EUROPEANS ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIR OWN INTERESTS OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS HAVE BEEN A SOURCE OF FRICTION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

#### THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE

THE EXPRESSION "WESTERN EUROPE" HAS SEVERAL MEANINGS. IT CAN INCLUDE ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE OUTSIDE THE SOVIET GROUPING (I.E., THE EUROPEAN OECD COUNTRIES, WITH OR WITHOUT YUGOSLAVIA); OR THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF NATO; OR THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. THE US HAS IMPORTANT RELATIONS WITH ALL OF THESE "LEVELS" OF EUROPE. BUT THERE ARE ALSO DIFFICULTIES IN THESE OVERLAPPING RELATIONSHIPS. US RELATIONS WITH EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES INCLUDE SECURITY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ELEMENTS, IN VARYING DEGREES, AND OUR RELATIONS WITH THEM IN MULTILATERAL BODIES--NATO, EC, OECD, GATT, IMF--CAN BE SEEN AS EXTENSIONS OF THE BILATERAL TIES. THE VERY COMPLEXITY OF THE ATLANTIC SYSTEM MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH SPECIFIC ISSUES, WHETHER POLITICAL-SECURITY OR POLITICAL-ECONOMIC, AND, THEREFORE, ESSENTIAL TO DEVELOP AN OVERALL COMMON FRAMEWORK FOR THE RELATIONSHIP.

IN 1973 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WAS ENLARGED BY THE ADMISSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, IRELAND AND DENMARK. THE COMMUNITY PURSUED, WITH VARYING SUCCESS, THE AMBITIOUS PROGRAM FOR ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION BY 1980 WHICH HAD BEEN DRAWN UP AT THE EC SUMMIT MEETING OF OCTOBER 1972.  
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US RELATIONS WITH THE EC AND ITS MEMBERS WERE ON TWO LEVELS, INVOLVING 1) MORE OR LESS BILATERAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, AND 2) THEIR POSITIONS IN RESPECT TO THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND MONETARY SYSTEMS.

IN THE PAST YEAR TENSION HAS LESSENED SOMEWHAT ON TWO IMPORTANT ECONOMIC ISSUES ON WHICH WE AND THE EC HAVE

DIFFERED. OUR DISAGREEMENTS ON AGRICULTURE, STEMMING IN LARGE PART FROM THE COMMON AGRICULTURE POLICY (CAP) OF THE EC, WHICH DISCRIMINATES AGAINST US AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS TO EUROPE, BECAME SOMEWHAT LESS CONTENTIOUS BECAUSE OF THE SHORT SUPPLY OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES

WORLDWIDE AND THE NEED FOR NEW APPROACHES TO EMERGING FOOD SHORTAGES. THE COMMUNITY HAS ALSO SHOWN INCREASED SENSITIVITY TO OUR CONCERNS OVER TRADE PREFERENCES IN ITS SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH AFRICAN AND MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES. THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE US BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ALSO HELPED IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE OF US-EC ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

ON THE MULTILATERAL SIDE, THE MAJOR ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE WORLDWIDE NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE AND MONETARY REFORM REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED AMONG THE PRINCIPAL INTERESTED PARTIES, INCLUDING JAPAN, THE EC, AND THE US. IT WILL PROBABLY TAKE SEVERAL YEARS TO NEGOTIATE SOLUTIONS TO SUCH QUESTIONS AS REDUCING TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE AND ESTABLISHING APPROPRIATE MECHANISMS FOR ENSURING BOTH FLEXIBILITY AND DISCIPLINE IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSEM. THE US AND THE EC, ALONG WITH JAPAN AND OTHERS, WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE TO GIVE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION AND GUIDANCE TO THE RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES IN A MANNER THAT WILL TAKE ACCOUNT OF THEIR INTER-DEPENDENCE AND OTHER TIES THAT LINK THEM.

ONE PROBLEM WHICH WE FACE IN THE TRADE AND MONETARY NEGOTIATIONS IS THAT THE US FAVORS AS BROAD AND OPEN AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM AS POSSIBLE, WHEREAS THE EC IN SOME CASES FAVORS MORE RESTRICTIVE POLICIES IN ORDER TO DEFINE ITS OWN "IDENTITY" VIS-A-VIS THE REST OF  
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THE WORLD. THIS PROBLEM IS NOT NEW, NOR IS IT CONFINED TO ECONOMIC MATTERS. EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW MONTHS, INCLUDING THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN UNDERWAY WITH RESPECT TO THE DECLARATIONS INITIATED BY SECRETARY KISSINGER, MAKE CLEAR THAT THE EC IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED TO ACT AS AN AUTONOMOUS ENTITY IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

WHAT CONCERNS US IS WHETHER THE EC'S "IDENTITY- IS TO BE DEFINED ONLY IN TERMS OF AN ADVERSARY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US.

ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP" AND "EUROPEAN IDENTITY"

THE US, OF COURSE, HAS SUPPORTED THE UNITY OF EUROPE SINCE THE WAR AND CONTINUES TO DO SO. OUR POLICY HAS ALWAYS

ASSUMED THAT A MORE UNITED EUROPE WOULD BE MORE STABLE, MORE WILLING TO CARRY A SHARE OF THE COMMON WESTERN DEFENSE EFFORT PROPORTIONATE TO ITS WEALTH, AND MORE ABLE TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS IN GENERAL.

WE HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE ACHIEVED

QUICKLY AND THAT, IN THE PROCESS OF REACHING THEIR GOAL, SOME OF THE POLICIES OF THE EUROPEANS MIGHT HAVE A CERTAIN SHORT-TERM PREJUDICIAL EFFECT ON OUR OWN. IN FACT, HOWEVER, WE HAVE SEEN MORE OF THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS OF SUCH UNITY AS EUROPE HAS ACHIEVED THAN THE POSITIVE BENEFITS WE HAD EXPECTED. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE MUST NOW ASK WHETHER THE EUROPEANS, AS THEY COME NEARER TO UNITY, ARE IN FACT GOING TO PLAY THE ROLE WHICH WE HAD HOPED WOULD BE THEIRS. WILL THEY CONTINUE TO TAKE PART IN A COMMON SECURITY EFFORT WITH THE US? WILL THEY UNDERSTAND THAT THESE SECURITY TIES ARE ONLY ONE ASPECT OF A BROADER COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP? WILL THEY RECOGNIZE THAT EUROPE IS A MAJOR MEMBER, ALONG WITH JAPAN AND THE US, IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND THAT ITS POLICIES MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE MEMBERS OF THAT SYSTEM? WE HAVE HAD REASON TO BE CONCERNED IN RECENT MONTHS ABOUT EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON ALL THESE QUESTIONS.

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LAST APRIL SECRETARY KISSINGER INVITED THE EUROPEANS TO JOIN IN A "FRESH ACT OF CREATION." IT WAS OUR BELIEF THAT NEW CONDITIONS REQUIRED A CONSTRUCTIVE ADAPTATION OF THE RELATIONSHIPS THAT HAD DEVELOPED DURING THE COLD WAR PERIOD. THE WORLD STRATEGIC BALANCE HAD CHANGED WITH THE EMERGENCE OF NEAR PARITY BETWEEN THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION; POLITICAL CONDITIONS WERE CHANGING AS THE PACE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN WEST AND EAST INCREASED; THE RELATIONS AMONG THE ADVANCED COUNTRIES THEMSELVES WERE BEING MODIFIED AS THE ECONOMIC STRENGTH OF BOTH WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN INCREASED. FURTHER, IF THE ALLIANCE SYSTEM WAS TO CONTINUE TO COMMAND ESSENTIAL POPULAR SUPPORT, ITS GOALS MUST BE ADAPTED AND EXPLAINED TO AN EMERGING GENERATION THAT HAD NOT LIVED THROUGH THE POSTWAR "ACT OF CREATION."

THE KEYNOTE OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S INITIATIVE WAS THE BELIEF THAT THE ADVANCED COUNTRIES, INCLUDING JAPAN, MUST APPROACH THE PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES BEFORE THEM IN A COMPREHENSIVE WAY, DEALING WITH DETAILS AND TECHNICAL ISSUES IN A BROADER SPIRIT OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATION AND COMMON GOALS. IF WE ARE NOT ABLE TO DO THIS, THE SPECIFIC ISSUES BEFORE US WOULD IN PRACTICE OVERSHADOW AND

EVENTUALLY UNDERMINE THE TIES WHICH, IN PRINCIPLE, WE MIGHT AGREE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

WE HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED THAT THE EUROPEANS HAVE APPROACHED THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REDEFINE OUR MUTUAL RELATIONS IN A CAUTIOUS, EVEN SUSPICIOUS MANNER. WE HAVE BEEN SURPRISED ALSO THAT THE EC MEMBERS HAVE BEEN HESITANT TO INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO ATLANTIC "PARTNERSHIP" IN THE

DECLARATION. WE DO NOT ATTACH EXCESSIVE IMPORTANCE TO THIS OR THAT WORD OR PHRASE BUT TO THE ATTITUDE REFLECTED. WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT THEIR RELUCTANCE MAY SUGGEST THAT THEY WISH TO NARROW OUR LONG-ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIP OR DEFINE IT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO REDUCE IT TO A MILITARY ALLIANCE WHOSE MEMBERS, IN OTHER AREAS, WILL BE COMPETITORS AND RIVALS.

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WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED TOO THAT THE EC HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OF DEFINING THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP WHICH EXISTS AMONG THEMSELVES, JAPAN AND THE US. IN OUR VIEW THESE COUNTRIES CONSTITUTE A COMMUNITY DISTINCT FROM BUT LINKED TO THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY REFERRED TO. AGAIN, THE ISSUE IS NOT ONE OF WORDS OR EVEN OF A DECLARATION; IT IS, RATHER, WHETHER THE EUROPEANS ARE READY TO ACCEPT THE FACT OF INTERDEPENDENCE AMONG THE THREE MAJOR ECONOMIC POWERS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD AND TO ACHIEVE, AS THE SECRETARY SAID, "A SHARED VIEW OF THE WORLD WE SEEK TO BUILD."

BY A COINCIDENCE OF TIME, THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATING THE US-EC AND NATO DECLARATIONS WITH THE ALLIES WERE ILLUSTRATED BY EVENTS FLOWING FROM THE OCTOBER WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THOSE EVENTS, INCLUDING THE PETROLEUM CRISIS THAT HAS FOLLOWED, MAKE THE REAFFIRMATION AND REDEFINITION OF BOTH THE US-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP AND THE US-EC-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER. OUR COMMON INTERESTS HAVE BEEN MADE PLAIN FOR ALL TO SEE. THEY INCLUDE NOT ONLY THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE ADVANCED COUNTRIES OF THE PETROLEUM SITUATION BUT ALSO THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THEM OF THE UNDERLYING POLITICAL SITUATIONS, LOCAL AND GLOBAL. EVENTS OF SUCH WIDE-RANGING IMPACT AFFECT ALL THE FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONS OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED. THEY CANNOT BE APPROACHED EPISODICALLY OR UNILATERALLY.

THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT WE BELIEVE THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE DECLARATIONS CALLED FOR BY THE SECRETARY WILL NOT PROCEED TO A POSITIVE CONCLUSION. RECENT EVENTS SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF PEOPLES IN THE EC AS WELL

AS IN THE US AND JAPAN OF THEIR MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE IN ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SECURITY MATTERS. TO WORK OUT TOGETHER THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THESE FACTS WAS THE PURPOSE, AFTER ALL, OF THE SECRETARY'S PROPOSAL. THAT TASK IS CLEARLY MORE URGENT THAN EVER, FOR RECENT EVENTS HAVE MADE PLAIN TO US, AND WE HOPE TO OTHERS, THAT NARROW UNILATERALISM OR SELECTIVE ISOLATIONISM CAN BENEFIT NO COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN EUROPE

AFTER PROLONGED, CAREFUL PREPARATION, THE FIRST PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) OPENED IN HELSINKI IN JULY, AT THE LEVEL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. THE SECOND PHASE, AT WORKING LEVEL, OPENED IN GENEVA IN OCTOBER. IF SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS ARE ACHIEVED IN THIS PHASE, IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT A THIRD WILL TAKE PLACE SOMETIME IN 1974 FOR THE CONCLUSION AND SIGNATURE OF AGREEMENTS.

THE US AND MOST OF THE EUROPEAN ALLIES WERE INITIALLY RESERVED ABOUT SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, WHOSE PURPOSE SEEMED TO BE LITTLE MORE THAN RATIFICATION OF THE STATUS QUO IN EUROPE AND ENHANCEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. NEVERTHELESS, IN LIGHT OF SOVIET ACTIONS ON OTHER ISSUES IN EUROPE, NOTABLY THE CONCLUSION IN 1971 OF THE FOUR-POWER AGREEMENT ON BERLIN, PROSPECTS FOR A USEFUL CONFERENCE APPEARED TO INCREASE.

ALLIED COOPERATION WAS GOOD IN THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE AND HAS BEEN GOOD SO FAR AT THE CONFERENCE MEETINGS THEMSELVES. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE NATO COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE A COMMON APPROACH TO KEY ISSUES, THOUGH OF COURSE THERE ARE CERTAIN DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS AND INTEREST AMONG THEM.

THE CSCE'S WORK IS DIVIDED INTO THREE SETS OF TOPICS, NAMELY, RELATIONS AMONG STATES; ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION; AND HUMAN CONTACTS. WE ANTICIPATE THAT GENERALLY SATISFACTORY RESULTS WILL BE ACHIEVED UNDER THE FIRST TWO HEADINGS, THOUGH WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT ANY COMMITMENTS THE USSR ENTERS INTO WITH RESPECT TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF OTHER STATES CAN BE RELIED ON WITHOUT QUALIFICATION. THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUES AT PRESENT INVOLVE THE FREER MOVEMENT OF PEOPLES AND IDEAS, A SUBJECT WHICH THE US AND MOST OF THE WEST EUROPEAN STATES SEE AS ESSENTIAL IF THERE IS TO BE MEANINGFUL

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RELAXATION OF TENSION IN EUROPE.

THE SECOND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION NOW UNDER WAY IS THAT CONCERNED WITH MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR), WHICH BEGAN IN OCTOBER. THIS, OF COURSE, IS AN ISSUE TO WHICH THE US ATTACHES THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE. LASTING DETENTE IN EUROPE WILL BE POSSIBLE ONLY WHEN THE

TWO ALLIANCES BEGIN REDUCING THE PRESENT HIGH LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES UNDER MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS. BUT THE ISSUES UNDER NEGOTIATION ARE EXTREMELY COMPLEX BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF MEASURING "SECURITY" AND OF COMPARING THE MILITARY WEIGHT IN A SECURITY "EQUATION" OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS STATIONED IN THE AREA UNDER DISCUSSION. FOR THESE REASONS THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE PROLONGED.

IN THIS CASE, AS IN THAT OF THE CSCE, THE INTERESTED COUNTRIES--WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FRANCE, WHICH HAS CHOSEN NOT TO TAKE PART--HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE COMMON POSITIONS IN RESPECT TO THESE VERY DIFFICULT ISSUES. THE STAKES ARE EVEN HIGHER THAN THOSE IN CSCE BECAUSE THE VERY SECURITY OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED--AND OF OTHERS TOO--IS AT ISSUE. FOR OUR PART, WE ARE DETERMINED THAT NOTHING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES OR IN WHATEVER AGREEMENT MAY RESULT FROM THEM WILL REDUCE THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE AND ITS MEMBERS IN EUROPE. WHAT WE WANT IS UNIMPAIRED SECURITY AT A LOWER LEVEL OF ARMAMENT.

IN ADDITION TO THESE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, MOST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE GROWING BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE. IT IS NOT SURPRISING, NOTWITHSTANDING THE HIGH LEVEL OF CONSULTATION AMONG THE ALLIES, THAT THERE IS SOME DEGREE OF CONCERN AMONG THEM AS TO THE BILATERAL DEALINGS THE OTHERS HAVE WITH THE EAST. THE US, FOR ITS PART, IS WELL AWARE OF THE INTEREST THE ALLIES TAKE IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE ON THE WHOLE SATISFIED WITH OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THEM ON THESE ISSUES AND WITH OUR CLEARCUT COMMITMENT TO JEOPARDIZE NO INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE, OR ANY MEMBER OF IT, IN OUR CONFIDENTIAL

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BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

DEFENSE

WHILE DEVELOPING BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE EASTERN COUNTRIES, THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAS ALSO, OF

COURSE, CONTINUED TO PURSUE ITS INDISPENSABLE SECURITY MISSION. AT THE SAME TIME THE ALLIANCE FACES SERIOUS PROBLEMS OF MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING ITS MILITARY EFFORT AS REQUIRED TO MEET THIS OBJECTIVE. MOST OF THE MEMBERS FACE DOMESTIC PRESSURES, FED BY DETENTE AND INTERNAL PROBLEMS, TO REDUCE THEIR EFFORTS. THE ALLIANCE MUST ALSO FACE THE PROBLEM OF BURDEN-SHARING, THAT IS, THE QUESTION OF IMPROVING THE PROPORTIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE OVERALL EFFORT OF SOME OF THE ALLIES WHOSE INPUT

IS RELATIVELY SMALL. THE US, WHOSE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS  
DIFFICULTIES ARE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED BY THE PRESENCE  
IN EUROPE OF MILITARY FORCES ASSIGNED TO THE ALLIANCE, IS  
NATURALLY PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING A SOLUTION  
OF THE BURDEN-SHARING PROBLEM. OUR CONCERNS OVER THIS  
ISSUE STEM NOT ONLY FROM ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS BUT FROM  
THE NEED TO PUT OUR MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE ON A  
SOUND AND LASTING BASIS WHICH CAN COMMAND WIDE SUPPORT IN  
THE US ITSELF. RUSH

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